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REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973-APPLICATION TO POSTSEC-
ONDARY EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS. Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979)
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,1 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 19732 within the narrow context of its application to
postsecondary educational programs. Section 504 prohibits dis-
crimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual, solely by reason of his handicap, under any program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance. 3 At issue in Davis was
(1) whether an educational institution's refusal to admit an indi-
vidual who is unable to meet physical qualifications required for
participation in a program is discriminatory, 4 and (2) whether the
institution is obligated to modify its program to assist an individ-
ual in overcoming his handicap.5
In basing its first decision under section 504 solely upon an
interpretation of the statutory term "otherwise qualified," the
Supreme Court did not find it necessary to indicate the method
or extent of judicial review to be used in deciding similar cases
brought on constitutional grounds, nor did it clearly define the
point at which the failure to undertake affirmative action be-
comes illegal discrimination. Resolution of these questions re-
mains a subject for future litigation, although an analysis of the
Court's opinion in Davis suggests possible approaches.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1979).
3. The statute provides in full:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in § 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or
by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promul-
gate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this
section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmen-
tal Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted
to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may
take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regula-
tion is so submitted to such committees.
Id. (emphasis added). The unitalicized portion of the section was added by the Rehabilita-
tion, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978 after the
commencement of this action and is not involved in respondent's claim. Pub. L. No. 95-
602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2364.
5. Id. at 2367-68.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Davis, a licensed practical nurse6 with a severe hearing disa-
bility,7 applied for admission to an associate degree program lead-
ing to licensure as a registered nurse.' Petitioner institution, a
recipient of federal financial assistance, refused to admit respon-
dent on the grounds that her hearing impairment prevented her
from performing safely, both in the clinical phase of the educa-
tional program and in the customary roles of a registered nurse
Respondent brought suit alleging that Southeastern had dis-
criminated against her based on her handicap in violation of sec-
tion 504 and the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.10 The district court found in favor of
Southeastern on the section 504 claim without reaching the con-
stitutional issues.' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the district court's interpretation of the statute erroneous, re-
versed, and remanded for further proceedings regarding respon-
dent's contention that section 504 required affirmative action by
Southeastern to enable respondent to complete the program. 2 On
writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the ruling of the court of appeals." Petitioner did not
raise the constitutional claims in the stages of appellate review;
therefore, the Court rested its opinion only on an interpretation
of section 504.
6. Respondent was licensed as a practical nurse in North Carolina, but she had not
worked in this capacity for several years; even when so employed, she had worked only a
limited amount of night duty. Id. at 2364 n.1. The Supreme Court indicated that it was
possible she could not function as a licensed practical nurse either, but noted the district
court's opinion that respondent's ability to function as a practical nurse, but not as a
registered nurse, might be explained by the constant supervision afforded licensed practi-
cal nurses. Id. at 2364-65 n.1.
7. An examination by an audiologist showed that respondent, with the assistance of
a hearing aid, was aware of gross sounds in her environment, but could not interpret
speech of others without lipreading. She was an excellent lipreader. 424 F. Supp. 1341,
1343 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
8. Admission criteria included an evaluation of the applicant's physical condition. Id.
9. Id. at 1345.
10. The action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Although respondent
had not followed her claim fully through the institutional grievance procedure, both the
district court, 424 F. Supp. at 1344, and court of appeals, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.
1978), ruled that her administrative remedies were sufficiently exhausted because any
further processing of her grievance would be futile.
11. 424 F. Supp. at 1346.
12. 574 F.2d at 1161-62.
13. 99 S. Ct. at 2371.
1980]
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The Court disposed of the case on the merits without reach-
ing the issue of whether section 504 permits a private cause of
action." Most lower courts that have ruled on this issue have
allowed a private cause of action, but the supporting theories are
varied.'5 Although resolution of this question arguably remains a
threshold issue in future actions brought pursuant to this statute,
the Court's approach reflects a tacit approval of a private cause
of action under section 504.16 The related issues of primary juris-
diction and exhaustion of remedies were not addressed in this
case and, therefore, remain unresolved."
11. SECTION 504 CLAIM
To be entitled to protection from discrimination under sec-
tion 504, an individual must be an "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual."18 For purposes of that section a
"handicapped individual" is anyone "who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."' 9
The Court's opinion centers around a determination of which of
14. Id. at 2366 n.5.
16. E.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (combined
analogy to private cause of action allowed in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) under
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the four-pronged analysis set forth in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C.
1977) (used contractual theory); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C.
1977) (used analogy to Lau). See generally Note, Enforcing Section 504 Regulations: The
Need for a Private Cause of Action to Remedy Discrimination Against the Handicapped,
27 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 345 (1978); Comment, § 504 and the HEW Regulations: Effectuating
the Rights of the Handicapped, 5 Omo N.U.L. REv. 107 (1978); Comment, Toward Equal
Rights for Handicapped Individuals: Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 676 (1977).
16. It is unclear whether a recently enacted section of the Act lends support to the
validity of a private cause of action by making available to any person aggrieved inder
section 504 the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a (West Supp. 1979). Congressional statements at the time
of amendments to the Act in 1974 reflect approval of a judicial remedy through private
action under section 504. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6391.
17. Both lower courts in this case did not reach the issue of exhaustion of remedies,
but stated that in respondsnt's case any further processing of the grievance would be
futile. 574 F.2d at 1160; 424 F. Supp. at 1344. See also Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039,
1045 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047, 1056 (M.D.N.C.
1977).
18. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1979).
19. Id. § 706(7)(B).
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these handicapped persons are, in addition, "otherwise qualified"
within the meaning of the statute.
The court of appeals ruled that "otherwise qualified handi-
capped person(s)" were those who could meet the requirements
of a program in all respects except for limitations imposed by
their handicap. 0 The Fourth Circuit found support for this view
in a regulation stating that to be "otherwise qualified" to pursue
postsecondary education an individual must meet academic and
technical admission requirements;2 the court did not believe
physical qualifications were included in the term "technical stan-
dards .1 2 Under this interpretation postsecondary educational
institutions could not take into account the nature of or limita-
tions resulting from a handicap in determining whether an indi-
vidual was qualified for admission. Such a literal interpretation
of the regulation is of questionable validity. Clearly the perform-
ance of certain activities requires specific physical abilities; for
example, sight is necessary for driving a motor vehicle.?
The Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpreta-
tion and accepted the district court's view as being closer to the
plain meaning of the statute. The Court ruled that "[a]n other-
wise qualified person is one who'is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap. '2 4 Citing the same regula-
tion as the Fourth Circuit, the Court determined that the term
"technical standards" included legitimate physical qualifica-
tions.25 Postsecondary educational institutions, therefore, are per-
mitted to take into account certain physical as well as academic
qualifications of applicants for admission to their programs.
The Court suggested that allowing the imposition of physical
requirements would not render all handicapped persons unable to
qualify. In its view, certain individuals who fall under the defini-
tion of handicapped, 2 can also be "otherwise qualified" because
they have no present incapacity or possess other abilities that
permit them to function sufficiently in spite of their handicap.?
20. 574 F.2d at 1160-61.
21. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (3) (1978). These regulations became effective after the district
court's decision in this case.
22. See 574 F.2d at 1161.
23. 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A at 405 (1978).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).
25. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1978)).
26. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
27. 99 S. Ct. at 2366-67 n.6. For cases in which handicapped individuals were found
1980]
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Through the imposition of physical requirements, institu-
tions may adopt a classification of persons, in this case the non-
hearing, whom they consider unqualified for admission to their
programs. A danger exists that institutions will draw this classifi-
cation too broadly and exclude individuals who can be "otherwise
qualified" under the Court's interpretation.
The Court stated that institutions could require legitimate
physical qualifications,"8 but did not indicate the proper standard
for determining legitimacy. Certainly, educational institutions,
or any other program or activity for that matter, cannot impose
physical requirements arbitrarily. The requirement 9hould be re-
lated to valid institutional purposes or goals and the manner in
which it is applied should distinguish between those individuals
who are qualified in spite of their handicaps and those who are
not.
The Court accepted, without detailed examination, South-
eastern's decision that the ability to hear speech was essential for
successful completion of the nursing program." In its view, there-
fore, respondent was not "otherwise qualified"; consequently, she
was not entitled, under the statute, to protection from discrimi-
nation. The Court's limited analysis of the validity of the classifi-
cation created by petitioner lessens the usefulness of the opinion
for developing clear guidelines for institutional requirements or
for predicting the extent and result of future judicial review of
similar cases. Through an examination of the Court's language,
as well as its approach in cases brought under similar statutes
and its analysis in reviewing other arguably discriminatory classi-
fications, a concept of the proper standard of review under section
504 emerges.
HI. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEw
At least one court has suggested that section 504 codifies the
constitutional right to equal protection.3 The Supreme Court did
not expressly support that view in Davis as it did in Regents of
to be otherwise qualified, see Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Barnes
v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp.
75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
28. 99 S. Ct. at 2367.
29. Id.
30. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
[Vol. 31
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the University of California v. Bakke,"1 when it determined the
standard of review under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,32 a statute almost identical in wording to section 504. Be-
cause of a strongly supportive legislative history, the Court in
Bakke first found that section 601 codified the equal protection
clause and then interpreted that statute utilizing an equal protec-
tion analysis.3 The Court in Davis expressly relied on an interpre-
tation of the statutory term, "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual," but the Court's language shows an equal protection
orientation. The Davis decision, therefore, may well have consti-
tutional underpinnings.
In Davis, the Supreme Court used the words "legitimate," 34
"reasonable," 3 and "necessary"3 to describe the physical qualifi-
cations that institutions may require for admission. The Court
has used these same words in applying the reasonableness stan-
dard of review to equal protection cases in which the classification
in question is neither suspect nor infringes upon a fundamental
right.37 Since lower courts have not considered suspect a classifi-
cation based on handicap,38 and have not regarded as fundamen-
tal the right to an education, 39 the use of the reasonableness stan-
dard of* review seems appropriate. Nonetheless, this standard re-
sults in only minimal scrutiny of state goals and the relationship
of the classification to realization of those goals. The cursory
analysis in Davis, viewed as an example of the application of this
standard, suggests that the standard of scrutiny should be raised
to the intermediate or strict level.4"
31. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
33. 438 U.S. at 285.87.
34. 99 S. Ct. at 2367.
35. Id. at 2371.
36. Id. at 2367.
37. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
38. E.g., Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds and remanded,
558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treat-
ment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANA CLARA L. REv. 855 (1975).
39. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40. For a discussion of the various standards of review used in equal protection cases,
see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrruTIoNA, LAw 522-27 (1978);
Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for
Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 89.
1980]
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Under a reasonableness standard, the state's action must be
rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state goal.4 '
Southeastern's stated goals were: to train persons to serve the
nursing profession in all customary roles, to prepare persons to be
licensed under the laws of the state, and, most importantly, to
ensure safety for patients.2 The rational relationship between the
petitioner's physical requirements and these goals is not facially
apparent, notwithstanding the Court's view to the contrary. First,
the court of appeals accepted respondent's contention that a
number of settings existed in which she could function satisfacto-
rily as a registered nurse."3 If this view is correct, respondent's
exclusion from the basic educational training program unneces-
sarily excludes her from an entire professional field"l-a harsh
result under a statute enacted to increase opportunities rather
than limit them. Second, none of the courts considering this case
examined the state statutes pertaining to registered-nurse licen-
sure to determine whether, in fact, the state could deny licensure
to respondent based on her handicap."5 Finally, those patient-
contact situations presented in which respondent allegedly could
not function safely were limited in number and scope." Even if
Southeastern's goals are conceded to be legitimate, the question
remains whether the exclusion of handicapped individuals like
respondent is rationally related to the achievement of these goals.
Yet another approach is open to the Court in examining ac-
tions of institutions under section 504. In several lower court
cases, automatic exclusion of handicapped persons was held in-
valid as creating an irrebuttable presumption. The question
41. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
42. 424 F. Supp. at 1344-45.
43. 574 F.2d at 1161 n.6.
44. Cf. Callaghan, Bona Fide Occupation Qualifications and the Military Employer:
Opportunities for Females and the Handicapped, 11 AKRON L. REv. 182 (1977) (women
and handicapped persons can perform many jobs in the military, and therefore should not
be excluded because of inability to complete basic training program).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-158 to -171.18 (1975). Section 90-171.5(7) does require that
applicants for licensure be mentally and physically competent, but no statute expressly
requires that an applicant be able to function in all possible settings.
46. 424 F. Supp. at 1343. The specific situations discussed were operating rooms
where the wearing of masks precludes lipreading and "situations. . . where the physician
would be unable to get the nurses' attention by other than vocal means." Id.
47. E.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Duran v. City of Tampa,
430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff failed
to show irreparable injury); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
See also Comment, Constitutional Law: Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine-Right of
Blind Teacher to Take Teacher's Examination, 23 WAYNE L. Rav. 1295 (1977).
[Vol. 31
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that arises is to what extent an individual must receive considera-
tion in determining his inability to function in a particular set-
ting. For a court to uphold an institution's automatic exclusion
of an individual on the presumption that his handicap would
prevent him from performing adequately, the presumption must
be true in a significant number of cases." Surely the possession
of certain handicaps would justify automatic exclusion, for exam-
ple, excluding a blind person from employment as a bus driver.
At the other end of the continuum are physical and mental condi-
tions that have little or no relation to adequate functioning in a
particular program."9
At the midpoint are cases such as Davis in which a handicap
may or may not affect functioning, depending on the severity of
the handicap and the requirements of the program or activity. If
the institution has, through policy or otherwise, excluded all per-
sons possessing the handicap merely on the basis of such posses-
sion, without consideration of that individual's abilities, this au-
tomatic exclusion creates an irrebuttable presumption. The Su-
preme Court has struck down irrebuttable presumptions as viola-
tive of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 0
Under the due process clause, a person is entitled to an objective
individual consideration of his ability to successfully participate
in a program.
In Davis, the Court said, "mere possession of a handicap is
not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in
a particular context."51 Although that language suggests possible
reliance upon the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions, 2 the
Court did not inquire whether respondent received an adequate
consideration of her individual abilities. This lack of inquiry is
disturbing, particularly since both the district court and court of
appeals indicated that further pursuit of the action by respondent
through the institution's grievance procedure would have been
futile." This view seems to suggest that any additional evidence
presented by petitioner would not have changed the result.
48. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 1124
(1977) and 429 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., concurring) with id. at 227-28 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
49. See Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
50. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2366.
52. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
53. 574 F.2d at 1160; 424 F. Supp. at 1344.
1980]
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The Supreme Court's reliance on the literal language of the
statute as the basis for its decision is disappointing. An equal
protection analysis seems more appropriate in light of the Court's
approach in similar cases." The Court's acceptance of Southeast-
ern's actions in Davis without detailed examination may be the
result of the respondent's failure to challenge the institution's
findings and, more significantly, the Court's deference to the in-
terest of the institution in setting up curricula, determining
methods of study, and selecting students." In the past, the Su-
preme Court has recognized and accepted the opinions of educa-
tional institutions in the interest of academic freedom and has
not subjected them to judicial review.5" It is hoped that in future
cases, particularly those encompassing constitutional claims, the
Court will scrutinize more closely allegedly discriminatory ac-
tions against handicapped individuals.
IV. REQUIREmENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Respondent contended that "§ 504, properly interpreted,
compels Southeastern to undertake affirmative action that would
dispense with the need for effective oral communication."'' 7 Davis
suggested that Southeastern could provide her with individual
supervision when she was performing direct patient care and
that, since it was not necessary to train her to function in all
possible employment roles of a registered nurse, Southeastern
could dispense with certain required courses." Respondent gar-
nered support for her argument in the regulations accompanying
section 504.
One regulation requires postsecondary educational institu-
tions covered by section 504 to provide auxiliary aids such as sign
64. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55. In discussing the need for a formalized hearing for academic dismissal, the Court
stated that "the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires
an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the proce-
dural tools of judicial or administrative decision making . . . . We decline to further
enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community . . . ." Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). Furthermore, the Court has recognized that
"[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
56. See note 55 supra.
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2368.
58. Id.
[Vol. 31
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language interpreters; it reads, however, that an institution
"need not provide . . . devices or services of a personal nature."59
The Supreme Court said that, under a reasonable interpretation
of the regulation, individual supervision did not come within the
meaning of auxiliary aids, but rather was a service of a personal
nature." Another regulatory provision requires institutions to
make modifications in academic requirements that are necessary
to ensure that the requirements do not discriminate. 1 According
to the Court, this regulation does not encompass a curricular
change such as that encouraged by Davis. 2 The regulation also
expressly exempts institutions from modifying academic require-
ments that are essential either to a program or to a licensing
statute.3
The Court found the modifications suggested by respondent
beyond the obligations imposed by the regulations. It also found
59. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1978). The regulation provides in full:
Auxiliary aids. (1) A recipient to which this subpart applies shall take such
steps as are necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is denied the
benefits of, excluded from participation in, or otherwise subjected to discrimina-
tion under the education program or activity operated by the recipient because
of the absence of educational auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory,
manual, or speaking skills.
(2) Auxiliary aids may include taped texts, interpreters or other effective
methods of making orally delivered materials available to students with hearing
impairments, readers in libraries for students with visual impairments, class-
room equipment adapted for use by students with manual impairments, and
other similar services and actions. Recipients need not provide attendants, indi-
vidually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices
or services of a personal nature.
Id.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1978). The regulation states in full:
Academic requirements. A recipient [of federal funds] to which this sub-
part applies shall make such modifications to its academic requirements as are
necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discriminate or have the
effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qualified handi-
capped applicant or student. Academic requirements that the recipient can
demonstrate are essential to the program of instruction being pursued by such
student or to any directly related licensing requirement will not be regarded as
discriminatory within the meaning of this section. Modifications may include
changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree require-
ments, substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are con-
ducted.
Id.
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2369.
63. See note 61 supra.
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that any interpretation of the regulations that required affirma-
tive efforts to overcome disabilities rather than efforts to ensure
evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons was of
questionable validity. 4 The Court went beyond mere interpreta-
tion of the regulations and concluded that nothing in the lan-
guage, purpose, or history of the statute imposed an affirmative
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds. 5 To support
this conclusion, the Court pointed to: (1) the virtual absence of
legislative history accompanying section 504 at the time of enact-
ment and the clear absence of legislative history relating to af-
firmative action;"6 (2) statements made by Congressional com-
mittee members at the time of amendment in 1974 and 1978,
which, even if construed in favor of respondent's position, could
not substitute for a timely showing of intent;67 (3) regulations
which can be accorded no deference since formulated involuntar-
ily by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare;"5 and
(4) Congressional provision for affirmative action in other sec-
tions of the Act, which indicates the ability of Congress to so
provide in a clear manner."
A comparison of section 504 with another, though unrelated,
antidiscrimination statute aids in resolving the affirmative action
issue in Davis. The language of section 504 is almost identical to
that of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;10 however, in
64. 99 S. Ct. at 2369. This view finds support in 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1978) which
states:
For purposes of this part, aids, benefits and services, to be equally effective,
are not required to produce the identical result or level of achievement for
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped per-
sons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or
to reach the same level of achievement, in the most integrated setting appropri-
ate to the person's needs.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2369-70. The government in an amicus curiae brief disagreed with
the Court. Id. at 2370 n.11.
66. Id. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 70, 133, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2123, 2143; H. CONF. REP. No. 93-500, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
41, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2143, 2154.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2370 n.. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Seass. 39-41, reprinted
in, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6390-91.
68. 99 S. Ct. at 2370 n.. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
did not voluntarily issue any regulations under section 504. Id. It formulated these regula-
tions only after Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.C.D.C. 1976) (a suit brought to
force such formulation) and Exec. Order No. 11914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 29, 1976)
(an order directing HEW to formulate regulations).
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2369. Affirmative action is required under 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) & (c)
(1976).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
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Lau v. Nichols, 71 the Supreme Court found that section 601 im-
posed affirmative duties. In Lau, Justice Stewart concluded that
the language of section 601 alone was insufficient; only with sup-
port of the accompanying regulations were such affirmative du-
ties imposed. 72 Justice Blackmun stressed that the large number
of persons affected by the alieged discrimination was of major
importance in requiring affirmative action. 73 The difference in
result between Lau and Davis can be attributed to the degree of
deference given the regulations, the varying extent of legislative
history, and the number of persons involved.
In the context of a classification based on handicap, use of a
test that rests upon the "number of persons affected" to trigger
an affirmative action requirement is problematic. Although the
number of handicapped individuals seeking admission to an edu-
cational program may be large, the modifications necessary to
accommodate these individuals will vary with each type of im-
pairment. A class of "handicapped" persons includes those with
varying motor and sensory impairments, mental handicaps, de-
bilitating diseases, and even alcoholism and drug addiction. 7 To
require an institution to modify its curriculum or method of in-
struction to account for each type of handicap would impose a
tremendous burden on the institution.
No lower court case decided exclusively under section 504 has
required an institution to aid a handicapped individual in
overcoming his handicap when the individual was not "otherwise
qualified." In two cases, however, preliminary injunctions were
granted requiring educational institutions to provide sign lan-
guage interpreters for deaf students who were found to be
"otherwise qualified" for admission.75 This suggests that, at least
71. 414 U.S. 63 (1974).
72. Id. at 570 (Stewart, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Lau the alleged discrimination affected
1800 Chinese school children.
74. In the employment context, however, certain alcohol and drug abusers do not
come within the definition of "handicapped individual" for the purposes of 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 794 (West Supp. 1979). 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
75. Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v.
Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). See also Comment, Civil
Rights-Handicapped Discrimination-Private College Required to Provide Interpreter
Service for Deaf Student Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Barnes v.
Converse, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S. C. 1977), 8 Cum. L. Rav. 979 (1978); Comment, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Private College: Barnes v. Converse, 29
MERcER L. REv. 745 (1978).
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for those individuals who can function effectively in a program in
spite of their handicap, an institution may be required to provide
assistance with auxiliary aids. This notion finds support in a 1978
amendment to the Act, which authorizes grants to state programs
to pay for sign language interpreters for the deaf.
7
1
Some courts have required transportation authorities to
make "special efforts" in providing modes of transportation that
are accessible to handicapped persons.7 7 Although the courts in
these cases have felt that section 504 created affirmative duties
and although regulations requiring special efforts under section
16 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196471 were promul-
gated partially under the authority of section 504,7 the UMTA
itself required the special efforts."0 These cases, therefore, lend
little support for the imposition of affirmative obligations solely
under section 504.
The Supreme Court summarized its views on the issue of
affirmative action under section 504 by saying:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to
extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against
handicapped persons always will be clear. It is possible to envi-
sion situations where an insistence on continuing past require-
ments and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely quali-
fied handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a
covered program. Technological advances can be expected to
enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or other-
wise to qualify them for some useful employment. Such ad-
vances also may enable attainment of these goals without im-
posing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a
State. Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to modify an
76. 29 U.S.C.A. § 775(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
77. Compare Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (requir-
ing commitment to an affirmative remedial program of substantial scope) and Bartels v.
Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (requiring special efforts to make public
transportation system accessible to the handicapped) with Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp.
656 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (requiring special efforts only to the extent of providing service that
is reasonable in comparison with that afforded to the general public, not to providing total
access) and Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson City Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D.
Ala. 1975), affl'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (requiring special efforts only within the
limits of existing technology; assistance in getting on and off vehicles does not have to be
provided).
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976) and 49 U.S.C.A. § 1612 (West Supp. 1979).
79. E.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977);
Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 828 (D. Colo. 1978).
80. 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976) and 49 U.S.C.A. § 1612 (West Supp. 1979).
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existing program might become unreasonable and discrimina-
tory.
81
Although the Court concluded that affirmative duties are not
imposed by section 504, it at least suggested that, when adequate
technology exists and when the financial burden is not excessive,
an institution's failure to modify a program may constitute dis-
crimination. Beyond that, the Court's language suggests no con-
crete guidelines for those persons in charge of programs and activ-
ities receiving federal financial assistance in their effort to pre-
vent discrimination against the handicapped.
V. CONCLUSION
The opinion of the Court in Davis .at the least suggests a
framework for lower courts in handling actions under section 504.
The statutory interpretation hinges on the definition of the words
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual." To be "otherwise
qualified" an individual must be able to function sufficiently in
the program or activity in spite of his handicap.82 Those handi-
capped persons who do not fall within the definition of "otherwise
qualified" are not protected from discrimination under the stat-
ute.
Institutions may require certain physical qualifications for
participants as long as these qualifications are legitimate or rea-
sonable." The process and standard to be used under the statute
in reviewing this legitimacy is less clear, particularly when an
educational program is involved, because of the Court's tendency
to defer to institutional decisions in the interest of academic free-
dom. When a noneducational institution is involved, the Court's
analysis may be more intensive. In reviewing, under the four-
teenth amendment, cases involving classifications of handi-
capped persons, the Court may follow lower courts in using the
reasonableness standard of review for equal protection chal-
lenges84 and an irrebuttable presumption test for due process
challenges.8
When the physical requirements imposea are found to be
81. 99 S. Ct. at 2370.
82. Id. at 2367.
83. Id.
84. See notes 34-46 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
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legitimate, an educational institution is not affirmatively obli-
gated to modify its program to enable an individual to overcome
his handicap. 6 The Court suggested, however, that at some point
an institution's failure to modify may become discriminatory, but
did not indicate where this point lies. The Court did present,
without elaboration, factors relevant to this determination: the
technological ability to accommodate the handicapped and the
extent of the administrative and financial burden on the institu-
tion in making modifications. Refusals to make relatively minor
and inexpensive changes may constitute illegal discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's opinion in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis provides limited guidance for insti-
tutions in planning admission and curricular requirements and
for lower courts in deciding similar cases. Hence, those who are
interested in evaluating the impact of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 on opportunities for the handicapped must await future ju-
dicial interpretation.
Linda L. Hightower
86. 99 S. Ct. at 2370.
87. Id.
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